

# SYAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE'S ROLE IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF THE KOREAN WAR

*Kuri Sravan Kumar<sup>1</sup>*

## ABSTRACT:

*Syama Prasad Mookerjee, also known as S. P. Mookerjee, was one of the prominent leaders in Indian politics and a key player in the evolution of Indian foreign policy, which occupied a space between bloc politics. In post-World War II, Korea became a playground for bloc politics and was divided into two parts at the 38th parallel line: North Korea and South Korea. In 1950, the Korean conflict turned into a Korean War, an immediate threat to world order, and the changes in the situation made Indian foreign policy to perform an arduous task in Korea. This paper follows S. P. Mookerjee's role in the construction of Indian foreign policy through the Korean War. It provides a new ray to the Korean conflict. Scholars such as Kim (2010) and Barnes (2013) have emphasised the lack of data regarding India's involvement in the Korean War. Nevertheless, none have addressed the role of Indian political parties in the Korean War. Despite the scholarly neglect, this paper attempts to find India's opposition voice, as in S. P. Mookerjee's significance in Indian foreign policy through the Korean War from an Indian political opposition standpoint and its analysis through the primary data of archival materials. It urges that S. P. Mookerjee emphasised that Indian foreign policy needs considerable revision, and the Korean conflict's fundamental problem is Korea's division and also follows the views of Hindu Mahasabha (HMS) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS); therefore, India needs to follow the policy of united Korea and on bloc politics that the world is big enough for all ideologies to co-exist. Moreover, there is a need to call for greater engagement of the Indian opposition party voice, S. P. Mookerjee, in the evolution of principal foreign policy, and the severely understudied field.*

**Keywords: Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Korean War, India-Korea Relations, Indian Foreign Policy, Cold War.**

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1 Doctoral Candidate, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.  
Email - kuri.shravan@gmail.com

## INTRODUCTION:

India and Korea have had a long historical connection. In addition, archaeological studies' recent discoveries of Megalithic rock showed a greater connection between both nations (Rajitha, 2017). Some unknown links exist between India and Korea, including the language and culture between Dravidian and Korean (Clippinger, 1984). Historically, India-Korea relations began with Queen Heo and Buddhism (Pankaj, 1989). Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore influenced modern Korean history, and inspired Korea's independence movement during the colonial period (Tayal, 2014).

The Korean question was raised as an international issue after the end of World War II. Cumings (1997) outlined the modern history of Korea and mentioned that, in 1945, after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki incidents, the Union of Soviet Socialist Russia (USSR) entered the Pacific War, and the Red Army marched into the northern side of Korea; the Soviet Union had always shown interest in Korea. The United States of America (USA) expanded from the southern side of Korea. Gupta (1977) mounted a meticulous study on India's peacekeeping activities during the Korean War and pointed out that in 1945, America started to bargain with the Soviet Union on the Korean peninsula; as a result, Korea was divided into two parts at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel line without the consultation of the Koreans. After the division, two opposite ideologies influenced the peninsula: Communism in the North and Capitalism in the South, which gradually conquered the peninsula.

In post-World War II, the United Nations (UN) was actively involved in several international issues, including the Korean conflict, which turned into the Korean War and resulted in the Korean crisis. Kim (2010) noted that, in September 1947, the USA brought the Korean conflict to the United Nations. However, the Soviet Union did not favour the UN's involvement in the Korean peninsula. Before the UN intervention in Korea, in May 1945, a four-power trusteeship was established, consisting of Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China; however, their efforts failed (Gupta, 1977).

In 1947, the UN came into the picture regarding the Korean peninsula

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(Kim, 2010). The settlement of Korea was raised in the UN, and the Korean question was turned into an international issue. India was involved in the Korean conflict following her independence. Indian policymakers saw an opportunity to mediate between the two blocs to find a solution to bring peace to the Korean War and the world order (Sen, 1967). Non-aligned states played a crucial role in the UN peace resolution on the Korean peninsula. The Korean crisis was a testing ground for Capitalist, Communist, and Non-Alignment ideologies, and each succeeded at some point.

The Korean War was not just a conflict between two countries. It was an ideological race of bloc politics (between America and the Soviet Union) for domination of one another in world affairs and beginning of Cold War (Jervis, 1980), and the Korean peninsula became a playground to the two big powers to wrest with each other for domination and control in world politics. India's involvement in the Korean crisis was inevitable with the concern of international order. India had to halt the war in the region and bring the warring sides to the negotiation table. Therefore, the Indian Parliaments discussed the Korean War and course of action and necessary modifications under the guidance of Indian parliamentarians.

This paper argues that S. P. Mookerjee emphasised that Indian foreign policy must take a realistic approach and undergo considerable revision as drifting towards war. It needs to focus on internal affairs first while also following world peace. The fundamental problem of the Korean conflict is the Korean division and, therefore, needs to focus on a united Korea. Furthermore, on the bloc politics, different ideologies can co-exist.

India's role in the Cold War context has recently begun to receive attention in research, though its importance has not yet been fully highlighted. Kim (2010) and Barnes (2013) raise the issue of the lack of data and sources regarding India's role in the Korean War. Kim (2010) noted that the role of India in the Korean War is relatively little known in both nations. Barnes (2013) wrote that at the National Archives of India of the Ministry of External Affairs, records relating to Korea remain closed, and at Prime Ministers Museum and Library (PMML), which was previously called the Nehru Memorial Museum

and Library (NMML), Nehru's post-independence papers have restricted access. This paper documents the Indian opposition's standpoint on the Korean War through S. P. Mookerjee's perspective on Indian foreign policy through archival materials.

This study can provide an opportunity to reconstruct the greater engagement of the Indian opposition party voice, S. P. Mookerjee and his associations the Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, in the evolution of principal foreign policy during the Korean War. It can shed light on the Indian opposition's standpoint on the Korean War by the following Indian foreign policy, the Non-Alignment.

## **INDIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA**

In March 1947, at the Asian Conference in Delhi, three representatives from the southern part of Korea participated in the conference (Tayal, 2014). It was the first modern interaction between Independent India and divided Korea, and here, some interceptions were developed on Korea's future in Asia.

Initially, Indian policymakers believed that a divided Korea would always be an unstable Korea, and nobody would be able to arrest its negative fallout. Therefore, India supported the unification of Korea in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and participated in conducting elections through United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). In November 1947, the United Nations set up a UNTCOK, responsible for conducting free and fair elections to form an independent national government in the Korean peninsula (Gupta, 1977). In February 1948, India chaired the UNTCOK, and initially, the commission was concerned with the whole of Korea, but later on, it supported elections in the southern part of Korea (Kim, 2010).

On May 10, 1948, the election was held in the south, and then on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formed under Syung Man-Rhee. In the north, in September 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established, with the support of the Soviet Union

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under Kim Il-Sung (Tiwari, 1988). In 1948, the United Nations Commission of Korea (UNCOK) was formed to replace UNTCOK because it could not bring unification and integration of all security forces in Korea. India again led the commission (Gupta, 1977). In 1947, 1948, and 1949, several civil conflicts occurred between North Korea and South Korea (Cumings, 1997). South Korean leader Syung Man-Rhee and North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung wanted to capture the other side of Korea and considered the Korean division an external event. Each side wanted to be the whole of Korea, and the conflicts constantly increased. Cumings (1997) pointed out that the most severe dispute occurred in Kaeseong and Ongjin.

The civil conflicts have to be resolved by the UN's based organisation, the UNCOK, but it failed to resolve the disputes, and the problem was raised to a position to take each other cities and enter into a war; however, it can be resolved by big powers diplomats, but they are unable to fulfil the task (Gupta, 1977). It shows the lack of independent organisation in the Korean peninsula; there was UNCOK in Korea, but the big powers dominated it and could not resolve the minor civil conflict. Later, this civil conflict became a big mess, like a war. However, UNTCOK and UNCOK could not handle Korea, especially from the Northern side of Korea (Dayal, 1959). Nevertheless, after Korea's division, the UN became a player in the Korean peninsula, but when it reached Korea, it was already dominated by the big powers. The big powers indirectly dominated UNCTOK and UNCOK, so the UN could not do much, and it failed, which further reflects the beginning of the Korean War.

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began, and the UN sought assistance from the world. India acknowledged North Korea as the aggressive side and sent the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance (PFA) team to the Korean War for medical assistance to support the UN command (Gupta, 1977). According to Barnes (2013), the Korean War was a perfect testing ground for Nehru's beliefs.

In the Korean War, India participated on humanitarian grounds and provided medical assistance through the 60th PFA. The UN forces crossed the 38th parallel line and forwarded to Pyongyang, which led China to intervene in the Korean War through the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA)

(Prasad, 1976). Then, the war escalated into a Korean crisis-unending war. Panikkar (1977) noted that India warned the UN forces against crossing the 38th parallel, which would provoke China, but the UN crossed, resulting in a crisis. On various platforms, Indian representatives stressed the importance of communist China in resolving the Korean crisis (Kumar, 2015). To some extent, diplomats played a peacemaker role between the countries to bring consensus on Korea regarding the America, the Soviet Union, and China. In 1953, Soviet leader Stalin's death and other factors led to stopping the Korean War, but neither side was ready to halt the war due to Prisoners of War (POW) issues. On July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom, and Indian diplomats contributed to commissioning the draft at the UN (Gupta, 1977).

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was established to handle the Prisoners of War and consisted of Czechoslovak, Poland, India, Sweden and Switzerland (Tiwari, 1988). In September 1953, the NNRC was established, and before getting the leadership of the NNRC, in August 1953, India sent an Advance Party to Korea for first-hand information (Gupta, 1977). In August 1953, the Custodian Force of India (CFI) was established under India to deal with POW. In February 1954, the NNRC completed its task in Korea and returned home. It was India's last mission in the Korean crisis. After the Korean War, India moved its foreign policy to a new level with an active role in world politics through Non-Alignment. Brecher (1962) mounted a meticulous study on neutralism and pointed out that India's role in the Korean crisis reflects one aspect of neutralism: a neutralist state can positively relax international tensions.

Through the Indian foreign policy, India participated in the Korean War in diverse roles inside and outside the peninsula. Indian foreign policy became very active in the international platform from the Korean question, and it was an essential milestone for independent India's future in world affairs. India's actions in the Korean War were discussed in the Parliaments, and political discourses and one of the prominent voices of the opposition was S. P. Mookerjee, who was the voice of the other side, which played an essential role in the evolution of the Indian foreign policy.

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## **S. P. MOOKERJEE IN INDIAN POLITICS:**

S. P. Mookerjee is one of the prominent leaders in Indian politics and played a role in world affairs and a key player in the evolution of Indian foreign policy, which occupied a space between bloc politics. He is a myriad of talented individuals with a diverse understanding of Independent India. However, he focused more on the realistic approach to the development of India and had a distinguished career in the academic and political fields (Baxter, 1969); in 1944, he became the President of Hindu Mahasabha (Bharatiya Jana Sangh). In 1941 and 1942, S. P. Mookerjee acted as a Minister of Finance in Bengal. In the early stage, he understood the function of Congress and emphasised the need for alternatives in the Indian political system (Ganguly, 2017).

Kashyap (1995) stated that S. P. Mookerjee was an “astute Parliamentarian.” After independence, he was one of several non-Congress politicians in Jawaharlal Nehru’s cabinet; and joined as Minister of Industries and Supply (Baxter, 1969). Pillai (1966) noted that in April 1950, S. P. Mookerjee resigned from the cabinet in a protest against the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact and joined the small opposition group in the Provisional Parliament. In Parliament, Nehru always respected S. P. Mookerjee and listened to his voice with great concern (Kashyap, 1995). Madhok (1969) highlighted that S. P. Mookerjee was the only opposition member who stood head and shoulders with Nehru in Parliament.

Baxter (1969) stated that, on May 5, 1950, S. P. Mookerjee delivered a lecture and announced the formation of the People’s Party in Hindi called Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS). That day, the conference adopted a program, selected S. P. Mookerjee as a provincial leader, and invited groups with similar thoughts to engage with the new party. The program contained eight points and, in foreign policy, mentioned the need for “a more realistic and independent attitude in matters of foreign policy consistent with Bharat’s paramount self-interest” (Baxter, 1969). Pillai (1966) mentioned that according to Myron Weiner, there are two critical factors in the formation of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh Party: an organisation called the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and a personality named S. P. Mookerjee. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha were closely knotted (Pillai, 1969).

The Jana Sangh election manifesto mentioned that the object of the party was to make India prosperous and powerful (Baxter, 1969). The Jana Sangh secured three seats in the first Lok Sabha and 33 in the Vidhan Sabha in the elections (Pillai, 1966). According to Pillai (1966), after the elections, especially from the opposition side, S. P. Mookerjee became a more vocal, active and responsible Parliamentarian. S. P. Mookerjee attempted to unite the thoughts that did not support Congress, the Socialists or the Communists. As a result, the 30 Parliamentarians joined the National Democratic Group (NDG) from Maha Sabha, Rama Rajya Parishad, Akali Dal, Ganatantra Parishad, Commonweal Party, Tamilnad Toiler's Party and some independents. In mid-1952, the NDG number increased to 32, but this group could not last long and loosened after the death of S. P. Mookerjee in 1953 (Kashyap, 1995).

S. P. Mookerjee was one of the first strong voices against Nehru's government on several subjects and later developed a collective effort to make the government act more effectively and progress towards some key issues. He believed that Indian foreign policy needs to follow a realistic method and the nation's self-interest. He emphasised first internal development and then the external issue as India-first and world-next.

### **S. P. MOOKERJEE IN PARLIAMENT ON THE KOREAN WAR:**

According to the Parliamentary Debates Vol. V, on August 3-4, 1950, in the emergency session, the Provisional Parliament of India introduced a discussion on Korean situation. In the debate, S. P. Mookerjee addressed the Indian foreign policy, stated that there is a need for "considerable revision", and the priority to be self-interest and simultaneously progress toward peace in the world. Accordingly, India supported two resolutions on Korea passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It implies that India supports establishing the "International Police system?" but why the action on Korea? Why not in other cases, such as Palestine, Indonesia, Holland, and Kashmir? Furthermore, why is the international system concerned more with Korea? Therefore, the Korean conflict needs to look at the interests of Korea and the possibility of a world crisis. The fundamental reason for the Korean crisis was



that “Korea was disunited.” Therefore, on the reunion of Korea, let us call for “Hands off Korea; you take off your hands” and enable the representatives of Korea and others to sit at a round table and discuss the basis of the Korean reunion rather than support UNSC resolutions. India supported the UNSC resolution and was ready to send medical assistance to South Korea. However, that was not the assistance the UN thought of India; they wanted India to go with the “whole hog.” India supports the UN resolution on South Korea and wants China’s involvement in Korea and what is China’s role in the issue of the Korean War. Korea was torn to pieces as two big powers came for the cause of protection of the people, but they “take away their birthright, their freedom.”

S. P. Mookerjee compared the India-Pakistan partition with North Korea and South Korea’s division and economic challenges (Parliament of India, 1950). He opined that India should not dictate what pattern to follow and what not to follow, and therefore, the world is “enough for all patterns to live together and not run at one another’s throat?” (Parliament of India, 1950). India must stand for an independent policy through “moral and political rights” and unite for the “foundation for United Korea” and must engage and cooperate with Koreans, not outsiders (Parliament of India, 1950). India must follow an independent foreign policy on re-unifying Korea, which is the only way to resolve the Korean crisis. Therefore, everyone should acknowledge the reunification and send a representative of North Korea and South Korea (Parliament of India, 1950).

On bloc politics, S. P. Mookerjee stated that we are not favouring this bloc over the other and our priorities will be India and the world’s interests. India has its thoughts and methods towards the world’s affairs and does not support blocs (Parliament of India, 1950). It was the first time the Republic of India took a stand on the ongoing conflict between the blocs. Furthermore, it is time for India to call for a united stand against oppressed people, and the slogan should be “United Korea” (Parliament of India, 1950).

On December 6-7, 1950, the Provisional Parliament of India introduced a discussion on the international situation. In the debate, S. P. Mookerjee

addressed the Korean War and that India needed to be concerned about its safety and security. He stated that he wants peace, aims to avoid war, follows the policy of negotiations, and must not follow “a policy of drift” into battle (Mookerjee, 1951).

Furthermore, the world order is at a critical juncture and needs to focus on “what should be our outlook and our policy” on international issues (Mookerjee, 1951). He observed certain inconsistencies in Indian foreign policy toward Korea. Jawaharlal Nehru emphasised that no settlement in the Korean conflict was possible without China. S. P. Mookerjee questioned whether it was the correct approach as it noted that China backed North Korea in aggression against South Korea. He appreciated America’s stand on North Korea as an “ideological conflict” rather than an attack. America is fighting the battle for democracy, and we must make ourselves “what we stand for” (Mookerjee, 1951). We must look at world peace and focus on our position as a realistic approach, and there will be possible repercussions if “Korea is allowed to develop into a theatre of world war” (Mookerjee, 1951).

S. P. Mookerjee opined that “this world is big enough for all of us to live in”, and different ideologies can co-exist (Mookerjee, 1951). India stands for the “doctrine of live and let live”, if there is an ultimate conflict between two-ism, then we will try to negotiate between them; if the dispute continues, what is next? Furthermore, what if it comes to our doorsteps? What will we do? Therefore, Indian foreign policy must be realistic (Mookerjee, 1951). In the Parliamentary Debates Vol. VI, he further emphasised that India stands for peace, but our inconsistent and uncertain policies are slowly drifting our nation to a disaster. In Parliaments, S. P. Mookerjee discussed the changes in the Korean War and the world crisis and mentioned that there is a need for changes in Indian foreign policy and India’s approach towards resolving the war and emphasised that different ideologies can co-exist without conflicts.

### **S. P. MOOKERJEE’S ASSOCIATIONS ON KOREAN WAR:**

S. P. Mookerjee’s attached associations took a standpoint on Indian Government policy during the Korean War. On July 3, 1950, in a press

conference, Narayan Bhaskar Khare (N. B. Khare), President of the Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha, characterised the Government of India's decision to support the United Nations resolution on the Korean War as "Camouflage neutrality" and urged the Government of India to formulate a "united foreign policy" along with the consideration of opposition parties, to encounter the world crisis with confidence and commented that United Nations followed a double stand by compare the Kashmir and Korea and criticised the Indian Government policy on Korean War (Hindu Mahasabha's Criticism, 1950; Pillai, 1969). The S. P. Mookerjee's attached organisations criticised the Government's role in Korea and opposed the Government of India for "taking active interest in the Cold War"; however, they stand for united Korea (Pillai, 1969).

According to the All India Hindu Mahasabha, C-182, (PMML) records, on October 2, 1950, the Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha held a working committee meeting and addressed the foreign policy on Korea and reminded the unfortunate partition of India and Pakistan. On December 14, 1950, the Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha, in an Anti-Hindu Code Conference held in Bengal and N. C. Chatterjee, stated, "Kashmir is still a vital problem, Korea is still fraught with peril" (All India Hindu Mahasabha, C-184, 1950).

On Indian foreign policy, the Hindu Mahasabha opinions that the policy of neutrality without the concern on defence policy is not a realistic approach, and if there is a war, then the policy of neutrality will not be respected by the blocs (All India Hindu Mahasabha, C-184, 1950). Therefore, we need to focus more on the development of defence.

On account of the international situation, the Hindu Mahasabha advised the Indian Government to update its military and commented on the UN's attitude by comparing Kashmir and Korea on the subject of aggression (All India Hindu Mahasabha, C-184, 1950). According to records of S. P. Mookerjee's writings (PMML), on December 1950, in the annual function of RSS, S. P. Mookerjee stated that there were drastic changes in the international situation and, at such time, the "greatest need is to strengthen the home front", as India needs to prepare and strengthen as per the changes in the international

situation. The associations did not want the Government of India to indulge in bloc politics as India follows a neutral policy and needs to follow a balanced approach between sides and focus on India's internal development. On several occasions, they compared Kashmir with Korea. They advised that India needs to plan for the future, as per the change in international situations, and emphasised a collective approach for united Korea.

### **S. P. MOOKERJEE ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY:**

Generally, a foreign policy learns lessons from pasts, national movements, and external events, which aims for future outlooks. The Indian freedom movement under British rule added important lessons to Indian foreign policy. Several international events have made Indian leaders aware of world affairs and have made them responsible leaders. S. P. Mookerjee considered that India must follow a realist foreign policy approach. He observed that the "success of a country's foreign policy could be judged only by results", and he urged India to focus more on internal issues (Nehru's Foreign Policy Not Independent, 1953).

Several prominent American politicians urged President Truman to demand a cease-fire, withdraw all foreign troops from Korea, and call for a "hand-off policy in Korea", similar to S. P. Mookerjee's thought (Hands-off Policy in Korea Urged, 1950). In foreign policy discussions, S. P. Mookerjee mentioned that Jawaharlal Nehru promised to call the leaders of opposition groups for an informal talk, however it occurred only once (Lok Sabha, 1990). S. P. Mookerjee considered that, on account of foreign policy, there would be an effective foreign policy only if there was a precise and proper system in the nation (Lok Sabha, 1990). Therefore, S. P. Mookerjee emphasised that priority should be internal rather than external. During the discussions in the Parliament, S. P. Mookerjee highlighted the changes in world order and the need to modify foreign policy for the future of India and world peace.

A draft of the Jana Sangh party under the guidance of S. P. Mookerjee mentioned that India's foreign policy now is "vacillation and inconsistency" and has not produced any result and, therefore, will focus on the "spirit of enlightened self-interest" (Mookerjee-Subject Files, PMML). Initially, there

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was some indifference to the Cold War among the Indian political leaders. However, the outbreak of the Korean War made Indian politicians and the masses concerned over the subject of the Cold War as Asia was turned into a fireball and could not escape further, so they needed to stop the flames.

S. P. Mookerjee's opinion on bloc politics is that India needs to deal with the bloc's issue not only from the international situation but also the point of safety and security of India and what is experiencing in the world today is "lust for power, possession, and prestige" (Lok Sabha, 1990). According to S. P. Mookerjee, the Korean conflict was due to division, and he criticised the Indian Government for linking the issue of China's admission into the UN to resolving the Korean War (Pillai, 1969). S. P. Mookerjee understood the depth of the Korean War and India's interests and limitations and advised the Indian foreign policy need to work on the goal of interest of Korea, which is Korean-ness as in united Korea which can stop the Korean War and indulge between the blocs are not a realistic approach of Indian foreign policy and need in-depth analysis on international events and prepare the Indian motherland at its best for the world peace and considered that the internal is first than external.

The opposition parties have limited consultations on foreign policy with the government. The Indian foreign policy on Korea aims to stop the war through international platforms with a multiplayer approach, but whereas S. P. Mookerjee views that the Korean War origin from the division of Korea and, therefore, Indian foreign policy should follow the reunification of Korea, which can halt the Korean War and restore the peace in the Korean peninsula and stability in the world order.

## **CONCLUSION:**

India played diverse roles in the Korean War under the guidance of Indian Parliamentarians. They understood the heat of the Korean War in blocs conflict and aimed to halt the Korean War, not to spread any other parts of Asia. The Indian foreign policy gained a unique experience in the Korean conflict, and S. P. Mookerjee served as a proof-reader of the Indian foreign policy and urged a revision. S. P. Mookerjee emphasised that the Korean War

was a conflict of the Korean question. Korean reunification is the only way to resolve the Korean question, and a united Korea can be accomplished through India's independent foreign policy. Therefore, India's foreign policy should focus on Korean-ness and world peace rather than other alternatives.

India's independent foreign policy must focus on a united Korea rather than managing between the blocs. Indian foreign policy is drifting towards war, and there is a need for a realistic approach to the Korean War as it becomes a theatre of world war. Therefore, Indian foreign policy must be revised considerably and should be focused on India's self-interest. By observance of international situations, Indians need to learn lessons and focus on the safety and security of the nation. In the world of bloc politics, different ideologies can co-exist without conflict. S. P. Mookerjee stresses that India should not take sides on blocs and strives for a realistic approach to the Korean conflict, and the Korean-ness is essential in resolving the Korean question.

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